Robert H. Bass

Department of Philosophy
Coastal Carolina University
P.O. Box 261954
Conway, SC 29528
(843) 349-6539
http://www.oocities.org/amosapient
rhbass@gmail.com

                                             

AOS:   Moral Theory

            Decision and Game Theory

            Political Philosophy

AOC:  Environmental Ethics

            Animal Ethics

            Philosophy of Religion

 

Education

Ph.D in Philosophy: Towards a Constructivist Eudaemonism, directed by Edward F. McClennen. Bowling Green State University, 2004.

M.A. in Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, 1996.

B.A. in Philosophy, Wofford College, 1979.

 

Positions Held

2006-present    Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC.

2001-2006       Visiting Assistant Professor, Visiting Lecturer, Adjunct Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL.


 

Select Scholarly Work
Book (Edited):

Readings on the Ultimate Questions, 3e, coedited with Nils Ch. Rauhut, Prentice-Hall, 2009.


Selections in Edited Books:

"Reflective Equilibrium," in Readings on the Ultimate Questions, 3e, edited by Nils Ch. Rauhut and Robert Bass, Prentice-Hall, 2009.

Lives in the Balance: Utilitarianism and Animal Research,” in The Ethics of Animal Research: In Theory and Practice, edited by Jeremy Garrett, Basic Bioethics Series, MIT Press, 2010 (forthcoming).


Articles:

Omniscience and the Identification Problem,” in Florida Philosophical Review, Summer 2007, available at http://philosophy.ucf.edu/fpr/files/FPR-7_1.pdf.

Undermining Indirect Duty Theories,” in Between the Species, 6, August 2006, http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/issue_06/06bass.pdf.

Pure Contractarianism: Promise, Problems, Prospects,” in Journal of Value Inquiry, 34, No. 2-3, September 2000, 319-332.

 

Reviews:

“Book Review: David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice” in Journal of Libertarian Studies (forthcoming).

Book Review: Mark Bernstein, Without a Tear: Our Tragic Relationship with Animals” in Journal of Value Inquiry, 39, No.2, June 2005, 273-277.

 

Papers and Presentations:

“Knowledge Without Truth?” American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago, IL, February 20, 2009.

Quotidian Medical Epistemology,” 35th Value Inquiry Conference, The College of New Jersey, Ewing, New Jersey, April 5, 2008.

Joyce as a Moral Anatomist,” South Carolina Society for Philosophy Conference (Joint Meeting with the North Carolina Philosophical Society), University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, February 29, 2008.

Small Contributions,” 34th Value Inquiry Conference, Adrian College, Adrian, MI, April 13, 2007.

Sunk Costs,” South Carolina Society for Philosophy Conference, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC, February 24, 2007.

“Indirect Duty Theories: Even if They’re Right, They’re Wrong,” Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals, American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Washington, DC, December 27, 2006.

Comments on Aaron Simmons’ ‘A Critique of Warren’s Weak Animal Rights View,’” Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals, American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, New York, NY, December 28, 2005.

“The Impossibility of Omniscience,” Florida Philosophical Association Conference, Cocoa Beach, FL, November 11, 2005.

Maximizing, Satisficing and the Normative Distinction Between Means and Ends,” 32nd Value Inquiry Conference, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, April 8, 2005.

Deciding Where to Meet for Dinner: Simple Problems and Joint Intentionality,” Department of Philosophy Colloquium, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL, March 30, 2005.

Chalmers and the Self-Knowledge Problem,” Department of Philosophy Colloquium, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, March 2000.

“Restoration Projects and the Tragedy of the Commons,” Society for Ecological Restoration conference, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, November 1997.

 

Work in Progress


“A Game-Theoretic Approach to Agent-Neutrality”

“Between Sustainability and What?”

Can Instrumental Reasoning Stand Alone?

How Equalization Upsets Equality

How Not to Resolve the Backward Induction Paradox

Ignorance as an Excuse

“Many Inscrutable Evils”

Mill’s Proof of Utility

Plan and Execution

Scruton's Illiberalism

Subjectivism and What Makes One's Life Go Better

The Basis of Liberty-Rights

The Normative Weight of Convention


 

Professional Affiliations

            American Philosophical Association

            American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy

            Association for Political Theory

            International Society for Environmental Ethics

            Society for Philosophy and Animal Minds

            Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals

            South Carolina Society for Philosophy

 

Teaching Experience

In addition to standard introductory courses, I have taught bioethics, environmental ethics, business ethics, and symbolic logic.  I have also taught an upper-level seminar in ethical theory as well as our department’s Capstone seminar in ethics, which I organized around the theme of evolution and moral theory, focusing primarily on meta-ethics.  In addition, I have experience with distance teaching, and regularly make use of on-line resources and teaching tools.  Syllabi and other teaching materials are available upon request.

 

Professional Service

Public Talks:

“Why It's Hard to Change the Environment One Person at a Time,” Celebration of Inquiry, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC, February 18-19, 2010 (forthcoming).

“Stories About Animals: What They're Like, Why They Matter,” Celebration of Inquiry, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC, February 12, 2009.

“Animal Minds, Animal Rights,” Friends of Philosophy, Coastal Carolina University, November 18, 2008.

“Understanding Animal Minds,” Conway Public Library, Conway, SC, May 14, 2008.

“Understanding Animal Minds,” Board of Visitors Community Dialogue Series, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC, February 20, 2008.

“Endangered Minds,” Celebration of Inquiry, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC, February 14, 2008.

“Morality and Animal Research: Lives in the Balance,” for Philosophy Club, Coastal Carolina University, March 29 and September 20, 2007.

“Is ‘Doin’ What Comes Naturally’ Ethical?” with Nils Rauhut, for Tea and Ethics, Jackson Ethics Center, Coastal Carolina University, September 14 and 28, 2006.

“What Meat-Eating is Good For,” for Diversity Program, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, Florida, November 14, 2005.

“Why Your Religious Beliefs Are Probably Mistaken,” for Philosophy Slam, Jacksonville, Florida, October 2002.

“Christianity and Politics,” for Food for Thought, a University of North Florida student group, Jacksonville, Florida, February 2002.

Chair:

Session on Theodicy, South Carolina Society for Philosophy Conference, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, February 29, 2008.

Session on Clinical Ethics, 32nd Value Inquiry Conference, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA, April 9, 2005.

Referee:

American Philosophical Quarterly

Journal of Libertarian Studies

Journal of Value Inquiry

Simon and Schuster

Springer

 

Administrative Service

2006-2009         Departmental Library Representative

2007-2009         Advisor to Phi Sigma Tau chapter, International Philosophy Honor Society

2008-2009         Member, Religious Studies Search Committee (Second search, in progress)

2007-2008         Member, Religious Studies Search Committee (First search, successfully completed in 2008)

2007-2008         Member, Committee on Revising the Philosophy Major

2007-2008         Member, Pre-Med Advisory Committee

 

 

Dissertation: Towards a Constructivist Eudaemonism

Committee: Edward F. McClennen (Chair), Loren E. Lomasky, Fred D. Miller, Jr., Catherine Cassara

Abstract

I seek to lay the groundwork for an approach to eudaemonism, where that is understood as holding that the central moral conception is of the agent living well or having a good life, and in which the moral virtues are essential to her doing so.  More specifically, I seek an approach grounded in practical reasoning – and especially in instrumental reasoning – rather than in eudaemonism’s traditional moorings in natural teleology.

 

In the first chapter, I argue that an approach based in natural teleology will not work.  Though we can make scientifically respectable sense of natural ends, they are suited at most to play a supporting rather than a leading role in moral theory. 

 

In the second chapter, the claims of decision theory to be an adequate formal representation of instrumental reasoning are examined and found wanting.  In particular, it is shown, first, that maximizing the satisfaction of a set of preferences is not plausibly a rational requirement upon action, because it is often not well-defined what maximization amounts to, and second, that decision theory does not adequately capture a central feature of ordinary instrumental reasoning, the normative distinction between ends and means.

 

In the third chapter, I develop an account of ordinary instrumental reasoning.  Beginning with the simplest cases, I identify two normative control conditions, that an end serves as a principle of selection from among options available to the agent and that reason-giving force flows uni-directionally from end to means, that together are both necessary and sufficient for a tract of reasoning to count as instrumental.  In these terms, I show that constitutive reasoning is a species of instrumental reasoning.  I also address questions about the normative standing of instrumental reasoning and argue that it has reason-giving force that does not derive from the value of the ends to which it is directed. 

 

In the fourth chapter, I discuss the structure of eudaemonism, with the aim of showing that there is an intelligible and attractive doctrine that can be disentangled from the natural teleology.  Building on the analysis of instrumental, and especially of constitutive reasoning, in Chapter Three, I classify and explain the relations among objectives, ultimate and final ends, constitutive and external means, and that which is pursued or sought for its own sake.  In these terms, we can characterize a form of eudaemonism as proposing that an agent should have or develop towards having an ultimate end of living well, with the virtues being partially constitutive of, and therefore necessary to, the ultimate end.

 

In the fifth chapter, I sketch an argument showing that instrumental reasoning, of the kind explicated in my third chapter, can bear on the selection of final and ultimate ends, and that it is plausible that the instrumental approach to moral theory that I am urging yields conclusions with a eudaemonistic structure.  The argument shows that there can be instrumental reason for acquiring an ultimate end, and that, partially constitutive of the ultimate end will be practical principles functionally equivalent to the virtues.  I also indicate directions for further development and exploration, having especially to do with the reach of instrumental reasoning, whether there is any scope for non-instrumental practical reasoning, and the connection of eudaemonist or virtue-ethical approaches to politics.

 

Professional References

 

E.F. McClennen

Professor of Political Philosophy and Political Science

Department of Philosophy

Syracuse University

Syracuse, New York

efmcclen@syr.edu

(315) 443-5822

 

Loren E. Lomasky

Cory Professor of Political Philosophy, Policy and Law

518 Cabell, Department of Philosophy

University of Virginia

Charlottesville, Virginia 22904

lel3f@virginia.edu

Office: (434) 924-6925 Fax: (434) 924-6927

 

Fred D. Miller, Jr.

Professor of Philosophy and Executive Director of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center

Department of Philosophy

Bowling Green State University

Bowling Green, Ohio 43403

fmiller@bgsu.edu

(419) 372-2536

 

Donald Scherer

Professor of Philosophy Emeritus

Department of Philosophy

Bowling Green State University

Bowling Green, Ohio 43403

dschere@bgnet.bgsu.edu

(419) 372-7142

 

David E. W. Fenner

Associate Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

University of North Florida

Jacksonville, Florida 32224

dfenner@unf.edu

(904) 620-1360

 

Michael S. Ruse

Associate Professor and Chair

Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

Coastal Carolina University

Conway, South Carolina 29526

mruse@coastal.edu

(843) 349-2548

 

Nils Ch. Rauhut

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

Coastal Carolina University

Conway, South Carolina 29526

nrauhut@coastal.edu

(843) 349-2547