_________________________________________________________________
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE:
POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
_________________________________________________________________
"Police departments like to claim that each high-profile
abuse is an aberration, committed by a `rogue' officer. But
these human rights violations persist because the
accountability systems are so defective."
-- Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports98/police/uspo14.htm
* * *
Police abuse remains one of the most serious and divisive
human rights violations in the United States. The excessive use
of force by police officers, including unjustified shootings,
severe beatings, fatal chokings, and rough treatment, persists
because overwhelming barriers to accountability make it possible
for officers who commit human rights violations to escape due
punishment and often to repeat their offenses.1 Police or public
officials greet each new report of brutality with denials or
explain that the act was an aberration, while the administrative
and criminal systems that should deter these abuses by holding
officers accountable instead virtually guarantee them impunity.
This report examines common obstacles to accountability for
police abuse in fourteen large cities representing most regions
of the nation. The cities examined are: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago,
Detroit, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New
York, Philadelphia, Portland, Providence, San Francisco, and
Washington, D.C. Research for this report was conducted over two
and a half years, from late 1995 through early 1998.
The brutality cases examined, which are set out in detail in
chapters on each city, are similar to cases that continue to
emerge in headlines and in survivors' complaints. It is important
to note, however, that because it is difficult to obtain case
information except where there is public scandal and/or
prosecution, this report relies heavily on cases that have
reached public attention; disciplinary action and criminal
prosecution are even less common than the cases set out below
would suggest.
Our investigation found that police brutality is persistent
in all of these cities; that systems to deal with abuse have had
similar failings in all the cities; and that, in each city
examined, complainants face enormous barriers in seeking
administrative punishment or criminal prosecution of officers who
have committed human rights violations. Despite claims to the
contrary from city officials where abuses have become scandals in
the media, efforts to make meaningful reforms have fallen short.
The barriers to accountability are remarkably similar from
city to city. Shortcomings in recruitment, training, and
management are common to all. So is the fact that officers who
repeatedly commit human rights violations tend to be a small
minority who taint entire police departments but are protected,
routinely, by the silence of their fellow officers and by flawed
systems of reporting, oversight, and accountability. Another
pervasive shortcoming is the scarcity of meaningful information
about trends in abuse; data are also lacking regarding the police
departments' response to those incidents and their plans or
actions to prevent brutality. Where data do exist, there is no
evidence that police administrators or, where relevant,
prosecutors, utilize available information in a way to deter
abuse.2 Another commonality in recent years is a recognition, in
most cities, about what needs to be done to fix troubled
departments. However, this encouraging development is coupled
with an official unwillingness to deal seriously with officers
who commit abuses until high-profile cases expose long-standing
negligence or tolerance of brutality.
One recent, positive development has been the federal
"pattern or practice" civil investigations, and subsequent
agreements, initiated by the U.S. Justice Department.3 In
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Steubenville, Ohio, the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division has examined shortcomings in
accountability for misconduct in those cities' police
departments; the cities agreed to implement reforms to end
violative practices rather than risk the Justice Department
taking a case to court for injunctive action. The reforms
proposed by the Justice Department were similar to those long
advocated by community activists and civil rights groups, and
included better use-of-force training and policies, stronger
reporting mechanisms, creation of early warning systems to
identify current, and potential, officers at risk of engaging in
abuse, and improved disciplinary procedures. The Justice
Department does not usually make its investigative choices
public, but several other police departments, including those in
Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, and Philadelphia, are
reportedly under investigation by the Civil Rights Division.
Police abuse experts, and some police officials, refer to
"problem" officers, by which they mean officers who either have
significant records of abuse or significant records of complaints
from the public, and who thus should receive special monitoring,
training and counseling to counter the heightened risk that they
will be involved in some future incident of misconduct or
brutality. In this report, we will use this terminology where
police officials and experts use it, to denote officers who, on
account of their record of either sustained or unsustained
complaints, appear to present a higher than normal risk of
committing human rights violations.
Allegations of police abuse are rife in cities throughout
the country and take many forms. This report uses specific
incidents as illustrations of the obstacles to deterring,
investigating and acting upon perceived abuses. Human Rights
Watch is presenting these cases not to accuse any particular
officer of an abuse, but rather to describe the barriers that
exist to addressing such allegations meaningfully. Any alleged
abuse has a corrosive effect on public trust of the police force,
and it is imperative that the system be reformed to prevent human
rights violations such as those described below.
* A seriously flawed background check of a new recruit who had
a history of abusive behavior while working for another
police department, apparent misuse of pepper spray, and poor
investigation procedures were evident in the Aaron Williams
case. (See San Francisco chapter for additional details.)
Williams died while in the custody of San Francisco police
officers after officers subdued him and sprayed him with
pepper spray in the Western Edition [sic] neighborhood in
June 1995. Williams, a burglary suspect, was bound with
wrist and ankle cuffs, and according to witnesses was hit
and kicked after he was restrained.4 Departmental rules
apparently were broken when the officers used pepper spray
repeatedly on Williams, who appeared to be high on drugs,
and officers did not monitor his breathing as required.5 One
of the officers involved in the incident, Marc Andaya, had
reportedly been the subject of as many as thirty-five
complaints while working with the Oakland police force
before being hired by the San Francisco Police Department.6
In Oakland, his supervisor reportedly had urged desk duty
for Andaya because of his "cowboy" behavior.7 It is not
clear why the San Francisco Police Department hired Andaya
in light of his background, but the press reported that
Andaya may have given only a partial account of his
complaint history and no thorough check was conducted.8
Andaya was accused of neglect of duty and using excessive
force, but the city's Police Commission initially deadlocked
on the charges (two for, two against, with one police
commissioner absent), which was in effect an exoneration. In
large part due to community outrage over the Williams case,
Andaya was eventually fired for lying about his disciplinary
background in his application.9
* A record of brutality complaints, inadequate supervision,
and the code of silence were illustrated in the Anthony Baez
case in New York City. (See New York City chapter for
additional details.) Baez, age twenty-nine, was choked to
death during an encounter with police Officer Francis X.
Livoti on December 22, 1994. Livoti had been the subject of
at least eleven brutality complaints over an eleven-year
period, including one that was substantiated by the city's
civilian review board involving the choking of a
sixteen-year-old who was allegedly riding a go-cart
recklessly.10 In the Baez case, Livoti was acquitted of
criminally negligent homicide in a judge-only trial ending
in October 1996. But in finding the prosecution's case
unproven, the judge nevertheless criticized conflicting and
inconsistent officer testimony, citing a "nest of perjury"
within the department.11 Livoti was then prosecuted
administratively to ascertain, in part, whether he had
broken departmental rules that prohibit applying a
chokehold.12 Partially in response to substantial publicity
and community outrage over Livoti's behavior, he was fired
in February 1997 for breaking departmental rules.
* The case of Frank Schmidt in Philadelphia illustrated flawed
investigative procedures and lax discipline. (See
Philadelphia chapter for additional details.) Officer
Christopher Rudy was on duty but reportedly visiting friends
and drinking alcohol at a warehouse in November 1993.13 A
dispute arose between the warehouse owner and Frank Schmidt,
with Schmidt accused of stealing items from the warehouse.
Schmidt reportedly told investigators that the warehouse
gates were locked behind him, a gun was put to his head, and
he was beaten as Officer Rudy watched and poured beer over
Schmidt's head. Throughout the ordeal, the warehouse owner
reportedly threatened to cut off Schmidt's hands with a
knife and to have warehouse workers rape him. Schmidt
reported the incident to the police, but Rudy was not
questioned for seven months and then denied everything. Rudy
reportedly received a twelve-day suspension for failing to
take police action and for conduct unbecoming a police
officer; he was returned to active duty.14
* Lax oversight and the failure to act quickly to dismiss an
abusive officer while he was still on probation were evident
in Minneapolis. (See Minneapolis chapter for additional
details.) Officer Michael Ray Parent was convicted in state
court of kidnaping and raping a woman in his squad car and
was sentenced to four years in prison in April 1995. In the
early morning hours of August 5, 1994, Officer Parent
stopped and questioned the woman. She acknowledged she had
been drinking, and he put her in the back seat of his squad
car and told her she was under arrest for driving under the
influence of alcohol. He then forced her to have oral sex
with him. After the incident was reported, investigators
found several prior complaints about Parent involving
inappropriate sexual conduct while on duty, even though he
had been on the force for only a year and a half before the
August 1994 incident; he had been accused of a sexual
incident during his probationary period on the force, when
dismissals are much easier.15
* Despite a civil jury trial leading to one of Indianapolis's
largest awards following a judgment against an officer who
fatally shot a burglary suspect, the officer remains on the
force. (See Indianapolis chapter for additional details.)
Officer Wayne Sharp, who is white, shot and killed Edmund
Powell, who was black, in June 1991.16 Sharp, a veteran
officer, claimed the shooting was accidental and that Powell
had swung a nail-studded board at him, yet according to at
least one witness, Powell was on the ground and had
apparently surrendered when he was shot.17 According to
witnesses, Powell allegedly stole something from a
department store, and Sharp chased him into an alley with
his gun drawn. The Marion County prosecutor brought the case
before a grand jury, and it declined to indict Sharp on any
criminal charges. Community activists claimed that the
shooting was racially motivated; Sharp had killed a black
burglary suspect ten years earlier and a grand jury had
declined to indict him. At that time, Sharp reportedly was
removed from street duty because of his "flirtation" with
the National Socialist White People's Party, a neo-Nazi
group.18 Powell's grandmother, Gertrude Jackson, alleging
Sharp intentionally shot Powell, filed a civil lawsuit in
1992; the jury found in favor of Jackson and awarded
$465,000 to Powell's family.19 The city had not paid Jackson
as of September 1997, and the status of any appeal was
unclear.20 Despite his history, Sharp was still on duty as
of mid-1997 and according to the police chief there has
received "high accolades and several awards for superior
work."21
* A ranking New Orleans officer who himself was responsible
for enforcing internal rules had a long history of abuse
complaints, some sustained, but was only dismissed after he
was convicted of a crime. (See New Orleans chapter for
additional details.) Lieutenant Christopher Maurice was the
subject of more than a dozen discourtesy and brutality
complaints before being charged and convicted on two counts
of simple battery in November 1995 (and fired two weeks
later). The charges stemmed from a June 1994 incident in
which Lt. Maurice allegedly slammed the head of radio
personality Richard Blake (known as Robert Sandifer) against
the police car's hood.22 Just after this encounter, Maurice
was found in violation of department rules for getting into
an argument and nearly a fistfight with a fellow officer
during ethics training in early 1994. Also in June 1994,
Maurice was served a warrant for another battery charge in
St. Tammany Parish. Prior to the 1994 incidents, he had been
suspended once (allegedly for brandishing his gun at a
neighbor) and reprimanded twice since 1985, according to his
civil service records. In a 1991 civil suit, the city paid a
$25,000 settlement to a man who claimed that Maurice had hit
him in the head with his police radio. Despite this record,
Maurice was the commander in charge of enforcing the
internal rules of the department. The city's citizen review
agency (an external monitoring office) reportedly
investigated several of the complaints against Maurice but
did not uphold any of them as valid.
Human Rights Watch recognizes that police officers, like
other people, will make mistakes when they are under pressure to
make split-second decisions regarding the use of force. Even the
best recruiting, training, and command oversight will not result
in flawless behavior on the part of all officers. Furthermore, we
recognize that policing in the United States is a dangerous job.
During 1996, 116 officers died while on duty nationwide (from all
causes - shootings, assaults, accidents, and natural causes).23
Yet, precisely because police officers can make mistakes, or
allow personal bias or emotion to enter into policing - and
because they are allowed, as a last resort, to use potentially
lethal force to subdue individuals they apprehend - police must
be subjected to intense scrutiny.24
The abuses described in this report are preventable.
Officers with long records of abuse, policies that are overly
vague, training that is substandard, and screening that is
inadequate all create opportunities for abuse. Perhaps most
important, and consistently lacking, is a system of oversight in
which supervisors hold their charges accountable for mistreatment
and are themselves reviewed and evaluated, in part, by how they
deal with subordinate officers who commit human rights
violations. Those who claim that each high-profile case of abuse
by a "rogue" officer is an aberration are missing the point:
problem officers frequently persist because the accountability
systems are so seriously flawed.
Police, state, and federal authorities are responsible for
holding police officers accountable for abusive or arbitrary
acts.25 Police officials must ensure that police officers are
punished when they violate administrative rules, while state and
federal prosecutors must prosecute criminal acts committed by
officers, and where appropriate, complicity by their superior
officers.26 Each of these entities apply different standards when
reviewing officer responsibility for an alleged abuse.27 All of
these authorities have an obligation to ensure that the conduct
of police officers meets international standards that prohibit
human rights violations and that, in general, the U.S. complies
with the obligations imposed by those treaties to which it is a
party. While only the federal government is responsible for
reporting internationally on U.S. compliance with the relevant
treaties, local and state officials share responsibility for
ensuring compliance within their jurisdictions.28
ENDNOTES
1. "Excessive force" is used throughout this report to refer to
force that exceeds what is objectively reasonable and necessary
in the circumstances confronting the officer to subdue a person,
as in Article 3 of the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement
Officials (see appendix H), which provides that: "Law enforcement
officials should use force only when strictly necessary and to
the extent required for the performance of their duty." GA
resolution 34/169 passed on December 17, 1979, and in the U.N.
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, which stipulates that, "Whenever the use
of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials
shall exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the
seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be
achieved." UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990). In Graham v.
Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held
that that the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment
requirement of "reasonableness" on the part of the police applies
to "all claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive
force - deadly or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other seizure of a free person." Throughout this report,
the term "excessive force" refers to abuse occurring both during
apprehension and while in custody. This report also describes
sexual assaults and torture by police officers which are not,
strictly speaking "excessive" use of force, but are unjustified
and criminal assaults.
2. In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
the U.S. Justice Department was tasked with collecting data on
the frequency and types of abuse complaints filed nationwide. At
the time of this writing, nearly four years later, no such report
has been issued. (See below.)
3. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
included a new statute under which the Justice Department may sue
for declaratory relief (a statement of the governing law) and
equitable relief (an order to abide by the law with specific
instructions describing actions that must be taken) if any
governmental authority or person acting on behalf of any
governmental authority engages in: "a pattern or practice of
conduct by law enforcement officers...that deprives persons of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." "Police Pattern or
Practice" 42 U.S.C. o14141.
4. Mary Curtius, "Despite Progressive Policies, S.F. Police,
Public at Odds," Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1997. Officer Marc
Andaya was reportedly injured during the incident.
5. Officers also reportedly placed a surgical mask on Williams
during the encounter and the mask was discarded at the scene;
examination of the mask may have made clear whether pepper spray
was used after Williams was subdued or if its use contributed to
his death by restricting breathing. Rachel Gordon and Katherine
Seligman, "Did cops skirt rules in death of suspect?" San
Francisco Examiner, June 8, 1995.
6. Susan Sward, "S.F. panel fires officer in Aaron Williams
case," San Francisco Chronicle, June 28, 1997.
7. Jim Herron Zamora, "S.F. cop cleared of using excess force,"
San Francisco Examiner, November 21, 1996.
8. Jim Herron Zamora, "Cop kicked suspect's head, say 3
witnesses," San Francisco Examiner, October 8, 1996; Zamora,
"S.F. cop cleared of using excess force," San Francisco Examiner,
November 21, 1996.
9. Susan Sward, "S.F. panel fires officers," San Francisco
Chronicle, June 28, 1997.
10. Clifford Krauss, "Case casts wide light on abuse by police,"
New York Times, April 15, 1995.
11. In September 1997, the Bronx District Attorney's office
announced it would reopen its perjury inquiry involving fifteen
officers of the 46th Precinct, where Livoti worked.
12. Of the fourteen city police departments examined by Human
Rights Watch, only four - San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Los
Angeles, and Minneapolis - still allow chokeholds. 1993 Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, 1993,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C., pp. 169-180.
13. Mark Bowden, "Major offenses by Philadelphia cops often bring
minor punishments," Philadelphia Inquirer, November 19, 1995; and
case files of off-duty actions provided to Temple University
Prof. James Fyfe by the police department's Internal Affairs
Division. He compiled case studies titled "Philadelphia police
off-duty actions: Complaints and Shootings," May 23, 1994.
14. Telephone confirmation of Rudy assignment with Philadelphia
Police Department, August 11, 1997.
15. Pat Pheifer, "Minneapolis officer held on charges of
assault," Minneapolis Star Tribune, September 2, 1994.
16. Erica Franklin, "Witness saw suspect prone before officer
shot him," Indianapolis Star, April 18, 1995.
17. Ibid.
18. Sherri Edwards and Erica Franklin, "Jury finds police officer
guilty of intentionally killing suspect," The Indianapolis Star,
April 22, 1995; U.P.I., "FBI probes police shooting," June 20,
1991; "Police confrontations," Indianapolis News, July 27, 1995.
19. Howard M. Smulevitz, "Jury award could bust IPD's bank,"
Indianapolis Star, April 25, 1995.
20. Welton W. Harris II, "Officer loses fatal shooting suit,"
Indianapolis News, April 22, 1995; Sherri Edwards and Erica
Franklin, "City may appeal verdict giving slain man's family
$465,000," Indianapolis Star, April 23, 1995; telephone interview
with Greg Ray of the Office of Corporation Counsel, July 28,
1997.
21. Letter to Human Rights Watch from Chief Michael H. Zunk,
dated January 26, 1998.
22. Maurice's appeal of his battery conviction was pending at the
time of this writing.
23. National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, online at
http://www.1nleomf.com/ and the Associated Press, December 31,
1996. The 1996 death total was the lowest since 1959. Of the 116,
more officers died from traffic accidents, falls, plane crashes
and heart attacks than by acts of criminal suspects or others
(shootings, stabbings, or assaults). During 1997, 159 law
enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty, including
seventy who were shot to death. During the 1990s, 151 officers
have been killed annually, on average.
24. Principle 4 of the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials states, "[L]aw
enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far
as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use
of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if
other means remain ineffective or without any promise of
achieving the intended result." UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1
(1990).
25. Principle 7 of the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials state, "Governments
shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms
by law enforcement officials is punished as a criminal offence
under their law." UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).
26. U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials, calls for accountability for superior
officers: "Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure
that superior officers are held responsible if they know, or
should have known, that law enforcement officials under their
command are resorting, or have resorted, to the unlawful use of
force and firearms, and they did not take all measures in their
power to prevent, suppress or report such use. Principle 24. UN
Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).
27. There are several standards used by different entities when
reviewing officer responsibility for an alleged abuse. In civil
cases, a "preponderance of the evidence" standard is used. A more
rigorous standard is used in state criminal cases (for charges
such as assault, manslaughter, murder, etc.), "beyond a
reasonable doubt," and in federal criminal civil rights cases, a
prosecutor must also prove that the officer in question
specifically intended to deprive an individual of his or her
civil rights. Whether in state or federal court, an officer must
be indicted by a grand jury before standing trial. And, when an
officer is administratively charged by his police department for
breaking the department's rules, the standard should be the same
as in civil cases - preponderance of the evidence - but in
practice is often similar to a criminal standard of "beyond a
reasonable doubt."
28. According to the Understanding filed by the U.S. upon its
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: "That the United States understands that this Covenant
shall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that
it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the
matters covered therein and otherwise by the state and local
governments; to the extent that state and local governments
exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government
shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end
that the competent authorities of the state or local governments
may take appropriate measures for the fulfilment of the
Covenant." (As submitted by the U.S. Senate on April 2, 1992.)
This provision is not a reservation and does not modify or limit
the international obligations of the United States under the
Covenant. Rather, it addresses the essentially domestic issue of
how the Covenant will be implemented within the U.S. federal
system. It serves to emphasize domestically that there was no
intent to alter the constitutional balance of authority between
federal government on the one hand and the state and local
governments on the other, or to use the provisions of the
Covenant to federalize matters now within the competence of the
states. It also serves to notify other States Parties that the
United States will implement its obligations under the Covenant
by appropriate legislative, executive and judicial means, federal
or state, and that the federal government will remove any federal
inhibition to the abilities of the constituent states to meet
their obligations in this regard.
Copyright 1998 Human Rights Watch
For more information contact:
Allyson Collins (Washington, D.C.) (202) 371-6599 x 133
Carroll Bogert (New York) (212) 216-1244
Kenneth Roth (New York) 212-216-1801
Jose Miguel Vivanco (Washington, D.C.) (202) 371-6599 x 145
[Spanish language U.S.-based media calls]
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