Abstract
The power of UN peacekeeping is characterized by international audience costs it can impose on a potential betrayer to peace. A metaphor of a “glass show window” illustrates its deterrent power. I proposed a game-theoretic model of peacekeeping as a “glass show window,” assuming a typical conflicting stituation conventionally called “Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack.” Conflicting parties, once trapped in this situation, would be unwilling to step forward for peace for fear of being betrayed by the other, even though they prefer peace to war. Equilibrium analysis of this model elucidates the conditions for peacekeeping. What is worth noting is, the analysis shows that we should not send peacekeepers under the circumstances of high betrayal benefits and low audience costs, and that we need not send them under those of low or moderate betrayal benefits. An empirical test using quadratic regression supports the hypotheses derived from this model.
Abstract
Why does the international community commit itself to UN peacekeeping operations? Peacekeeping operations are characterized by costs borne by contributors and benefits for all. Despite rationalists’ predictions that states experiencing anarchy will free-ride on the peacekeeping efforts of others, many states have committed to making contributions. Relying on public goods theory study, rationalists have difficulty explaining this puzzle. Therefore, this study attempts to apply the constructivists’ framework instead. The world polity approach is adopted, in which the global diffusion of the norm favoring peacekeeping plays a key role. The hypothesis is that the emergence and diffusion of this idea encourages participation in costly operations. Event history analysis tests this hypothesis and elucidates the strength of constructivism to explain how long it takes a state to make its first participation in peacekeeping operations.
Abstract
It is puzzling that even an unrivaled superpower act multilaterally, and not unilaterally. We develop a signaling theory based on a game-theoric model to address this puzzle: multilateralism pursued by a hegemon. Given the asymmetry of information, the informed player (hegemon) wants to signal to the uninformed player (follower) that he is a good-type player, or a benevolent hegemon. The choice of multilateralism, as opposed to unilateralism, is a costly signal which a bad-type player or a coercive hegemon cannot afford, and therefore convincing. Our model attains various equilibria under different conditions: Pooling on Unilateralism; Separating; Pooling on Multilateralism. The U.S. attitude in the Persian Gulf War illustrates how this signaling plays out in reality. Various explanations were advanced for the U.S. choice of multilateralism in the case: norms; legality; legitimacy; military benefits; cost sharing. They are, however, insufficient as explanations for this case. Our signaling theory can fill the gap they left.
要旨
集団安全保障の理論的困難は，アナーキーな国際社会において各国に利他的な協力行動を要求する点にある．本研究はこの制度が機能するための条件をゲーム理論の「チェーンストアのパラドクス」モデルによって探り，「平和の不可分性」と「長期的関係」の成立が不可欠であることを示した．
要旨
本研究は，国連平和維持活動への参加を国際公共財と捉えた上で，ただ乗りが横行するはずの国際社会において，なぜ各国が自発的に協力するのかを探った．生存分析の結果，覇権安定論や非純粋公共財論よりも，構成主義の流れを汲む世界文化論の説明力が強いことが確認された．
要旨
内戦に関与した指導者や兵士達は，内戦終結と同時に収奪機会や権力の喪失，戦争犯罪での訴追等のリスクにさらされる．このため彼らは自己保身から意図的に内戦を継続する動機を持つ．このような状況下ではたとえ秩序回復が容易であるはずの事例においてもなかなか内戦は終結しない．この二段階の連動を無視した分析はセレクション・バイアスを生む．本研究は，ヘックマン（Heckman）流の二段階の統計手法によってこのバイアスを補正し，国連の介入や政治体制等が与える影響について新たな知見を導いた．すなわち，国連の介入は紛争終結には有効ではないが，秩序回復には非常に有効であった．一方，国連以外の介入は逆の傾向が認められた．その他，窮地に追い込まれた政治指導者は起死回生を図ってハイリスク・ハイリターンな政策を追求しがちであるという「起死回生のギャンブル」仮説，資源収奪の誘因に注目した「強欲」仮説，等も支持された．最後に以上の分析に基づいて秩序回復の確率に関する予測を試みた．