The Natural Resource Curse
Francesco Caselli
CEI - Lent 2005
Overview
Many examples of resource rich countries with very low incomes/growth
rates.
Many example of growth rates declines after term-of-trade/resource-
discovery/aid windfalls.
While causation largely unproven suggests possible existence of a re-
source curse.
See January 27 FT article on Sao Tome and Principe.
Possible explanations include Dutch disease and Voracity effect
models.
Dutch disease models
After windfall resources flow to natural resource sector.
Natural resource sector has lower productivity growth.
Growth slows down.
Or
After windfall more leisure and less investment.
Growth slows down.
Problem
Tend to imply people not worse off.
Voracity effect model
There are two sectors: oil and everything else. Price of oil fixed at p.
One unit of non-oil good invested in oil-producing equipment yields α
units of oil (hence pα in non-oil good).
One unit of non-oil good invested in non-oil-producing equipment
yields β units of non-oil good.
The oils sector is more productive:
β < pα.
Two groups in the economy. Group i starts out with ki
units of oil-
producing equipment and group 2 with bi
units of non-oil-producing
equipment.
Each group i maximizes
Zσ1 − σc(σ−1/σ)ie−δ(s−t)
where ci
is units of non-oil good (so lets call it consumption good).
Each group i is entitled to a transfer ri
of its own choosing from the
government in units of the consumption good.
These transfers must be financed from proportional taxes τ on the
revenues of the oil sector:
r1+ r2= ταpK = ταp(k1+ k2)
where K is oil-producing equipment.
Some additional technical assumptions.
Some properties of the model
If groups cooperate, only invest in oil-producing capital (since αp > β).
Without cooperation, each group has incentive to overtax oil income
because the tax hits partially the other group as well.
As a result, each group will now invest in both oil-producing and non-oil-producing equipment (at least under a certain choice of parameter
values). This is inefficient of course.
Still, oil-rich countries should do no worse than oil-poor ones, or not
yet clear why growth rates should fall after windfalls.
Surprising result of paper is that growth of K falls when pα goes up.
Key arbitrage equation for each group ipα − xi= β
where xi
is effectively chosen by other group. So xi= pα − β.
Growth is
˙K = (pα − x1− x2)K= 2β − pα.
So higher pα countries/periods have lower growth.
Possible problems
Damn unintuitive!
Oil sector shrinks following oil-price boom!
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian
Cross-country empirical analysis
First-stage institutions (or rather policies) on resources.
Second-stage growth on institutions and resources.
Resource curse works through institutions.
Fuel and minerals particularly bad.
Nigeria
No growth in per capita GDP since oil discovery, despite enormous
cumulated revenues from oil sales.
Public investment boom, but very low subsequent capacity utilization.
Huge increase in inequality.
Would growth have been positive without oil? Would inequality
not have fallen?
Proposal: pay out oil revenues directly to Nigerians.
Is there an aid curse?
Very hard to find empirical evidence that aid has been helpful.
Evidence that aid may have been unhelpful at least as solid (e.g. work
by P. Boone here at LSE).
Calls into question recent renewal of emphasis on aid (e.g. UKs Africa
initiative)
Are debt forgiveness and aid perfect substitute?
Common wisdom says yes (money saved on debt service is freed up).
Arslanap and Henry say no: aid is better, at least for the HIPCs.
Very important as relief vs. aid decision is critical current policy issue.
Arslanap and Henry argument 1: Net Resource Transfer (aid+debt
relief) to HIPCs has declined since program inception.
Arslanap and Henry argument 2: Debt relief skews NRT towards bilateral aid, which might be less effective than multilateral aid. Argument
is: debt relief leads to dollar-for-dollar decline in overall aid, but bilateral aid is constant. Multilateral aid falls.
Whether or not their argument is convincing, debt relief is no better
than aid: is there then a debt-relief curse?
The prosaic view expressed by the author about neo-colonial 'aid', as a
developmentally neutral to minimally subversive influence of bootstrap development, does
not reflect that of SoACT.
Communities urged to accept disabled Children
March 18, GNA - Mr Kwame Tay, 'Ghana' National Coordinator for
Inclusive Education of Special Education on Thursday called on communities to
accept disabled children in ordinary schools located in their areas.
Mr Tay was speaking at a day's seminar for 24 heads of schools in the
Volta Region at Ho on the theme: "strategising for effective service delivery
for all children in special needs".
He said globally, the new trend of education of children with special needs had
become necessary due to the way society tend to look mean upon them, adding that
this affected their integration into the society.
"This is the only way children will not consider the disabled as evils and fear
them", he said.
Mr Victor Bansah, Volta Regional Co-ordinator of Special Needs Education, asked
special educators to work assiduously as potential advocates for people with
activity limitation.
Mr Samuel Donkor Gyang, Regional Director of Education, also cautioned
participants to be imbued with human qualities such as patience and good human
approach.
Modify or | index |
2005 action research |
if only | 'outsourcing'
|
48th birthday |
World Bank 2005
Bush Appoints Bloodthirsty Psychopath
to head World Bank - painting 'aid' in its true colours is going to much easier with
the delightful Woolfowitz as its boss.
16-03-05
|